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THE TRI-FUNCTIONAL MODEL AND FAIRNESS
AT THE SEC: RESPONDING TO
MR. FLEISCHMAN*
John M. Fedders **
Former Securities and Exchange Commissioner Edward H. Fleischman
has expressed concerns about the fair administration of justice by reason of
the combination of the three functions--quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative, and
quasi-executive-performed by the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).' I do not share his concerns.
Fleischman has written that the SEC's exercise of" 'combin[ing] its judi-
cial work with work of policy-determination' "2 does not satisfy the appear-
ance of justice test articulated by the United States Supreme Court.3
Fleischman has even concluded that the SEC's prime aim in administering
justice is not justice at all, but rather the execution of the legislative policy
derived from its enabling statutes.4 I believe that both his conclusions and
his analysis are flawed.5 There are no examples of failure by the SEC to
carry out any of its responsibilities with integrity and fairness. Conse-
* This Essay is based on Mr. Fedders' remarks at the first in an occasional series of The
Catholic University of America Securities Issues Forum. The Securities Alumni Practice
Group of The Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America sponsored the
Forum, which was held in September, 1992, in Washington, D.C.
** Mr. Fedders is a graduate of Marquette University, and of The Columbus School of
Law, The Catholic University of America. He is a former Director of the SEC's Division of
Enforcement. He currently practices law in Washington, D.C. and New York.
1. See Edward H. Fleischman, Toward Neutral Principles: The SEC's Discharge of Its
Tri-functional Administrative Responsibilities, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 251 (1993).
2. The Stuart-James Co., 48 S.E.C. 22, 27 (1991) (Fleischman, Comm'r, concurring)
(quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT OF THE COMM.
WITH STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 222
(1937) [hereinafter BROWNLOW COMM. REPORT] (Study Report of Robert E. Cushman, The
Problem of the Independent Regulatory Commissions)).
3. Id. at 27 n. . The Supreme Court first stated its test in Offutt v. United States, 348
U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ("[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice."), which was later recog-
nized in Antoniu v. SEC, 877 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
4. See Fleischman, supra note 1, at 253 (quoting Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Jus-
tice and Its Place in the Legal Order, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1390, 1406 (1955)).
5. Fleischman's views would have received no more than a passing glance were it not for
his great intellect, unquestioned integrity, and experience and courage as a commissioner.
While I disagree with his opinion and analysis, I have given it careful study and research
because of my respect for his character and his conduct during six years of service as an SEC
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quently, there is no reason to strip the SEC of its tri-functional administra-
tive responsibilities.6
Fleischman first articuated his views on fairness under the tri-functional
model in his concurring opinion in the SEC decision in The Stuart-James
Co. case.7 In his concurring opinion, Fleischman set forth arguments of bias
and the lack of the appearance of fairness by the SEC in its adjudicative
duties.' His conclusions are unfounded, and express a concern only of what
hypothetically could happen rather than expose the actual existence of an
unfair process at the SEC.
While I am critical of Fleischman's concurring opinion in The Stuart-
James case, the majority opinion itself was self-righteous. The SEC's protec-
tionism is evidenced by the majority's expressed concern with "eliminat[ing]
the risk of additional litigation and unfavorable precedent if an appeal is
taken [from an SEC decision] to a United States Court of Appeals."9 Rather
than strive to avoid judicial scrutiny of its opinions, the SEC should never
resist reasonable efforts by respondents to have the federal courts scrutinize
the SEC's acts as a quasi-judicial authority. More often than not, the SEC
will prevail in the appellate process. When it does not, the integrity of the
marketplace will be enhanced. Since the tendency of the law always must be
to narrow the field of uncertainty, judicial review of SEC actions will assist
the "narrowing process" in the securities law area.
If the Supreme Court were to consider the constitutionality of the SEC's
quasi-judicial authority, I believe the Court would uphold the tri-functional
administrative scheme by a unanimous vote. The Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) ° and the SEC's legislatively granted duties under the Securities
commissioner. As a dean of the securities bar, and one of its leaders, any view Fleischman
expresses in the field of securities law merits attention and discussion.
6. Cf H. REP. No. 671, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1992) ("[W]e are unwilling to change
the [FAA's] procedures of the civil penalty program on the basis of perceptions of unfairness,
when these perceptions have no basis in reality.").
7. The Stuart-James Co., 48 S.E.C. at 27-33 (Fleischman, Comm'r, concurring). In this
administrative proceeding, the eight respondents moved to, inter alia: (1) dismiss the proceed-
ing, (2) disqualify those SEC commissioners who accepted an offer of settlement from a former
respondent in the action, and (3) compel production of internal SEC staff memoranda and ex
parte communications between the staff and the commissioners concerning settlement with a
former respondent in the action. Id. at 22. In short, the respondents argued that the commis-
sioners prejudged the essential facts adverse to them, and that it is virtually impossible for the
SEC to entertain individual settlements in proceedings involving multiple respondents. Id
The SEC denied the motions. It concluded that the commissioners' approval of the settle-
ment in question was a proper exercise of its authority to control its administrative docket, and
that such action was not a prejudgment and did not interfere in their acting as an impartial and
disinterested tribunal in the proceeding against the eight remaining respondents. Id. at 26-27.
8. Id. at 27.
9. Id. at 24.
10. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1988).
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Act of 1933 ("the 1933 Act")1 ' and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("the 1934 Act") 12 would be upheld. Fleischman's arguments are unappeal-
ing to both judicial activists and strict constructionists, and are therefore
unlikely to result in a Supreme Court decision stripping the SEC of any of its
duties. Consider the following eight points in support of my analysis.
First, the Supreme Court's prior opinions addressing the APA 13 and the
SEC's tri-functional authority 14 provide no jurisprudential support for
Fleischman's views.
Second, the APA and its legislative history unquestionably contemplate
that administrative agencies would undertake adjudicatory duties while also
exercising regulatory and law enforcement responsibilities.' 5
Third, the SEC's administrative proceeding process does not lack due pro-
cess. Fleischman infers, but does not specifically document, that the SEC's
exercise of its judicial duties lacks fairness or the appearance of fairness.
While the SEC's adjudicatory process is painfully slow, there is no inherent
lack of fairness. Furthermore, in February, 1993, the SEC issued its own
Task Force Report for improving the efficiency of the process. 16
The internal execution of the SEC's tri-functional administrative responsi-
bilities may be characterized as a debate-oriented process. Each quasi-judi-
cial, quasi-legislative, and quasi-executive decision is first subject to a formal
contest of argumentation in which opposing teams defend and attack a given
proposition. The SEC commissioners and staff do not function as an intel-
lectually homogenous class. Moreover, these debates of opposing points are
not restricted to the SEC internal process. Most often, commissioners and
staff widely publicize their differing views on each SEC action in congres-
sional testimony, concurring or dissenting opinions, speeches and papers.
11. Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, Tit. I, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77a -77aa (1988)).
12. Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, Tit. I, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
13. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (holding the mere combination of
investigative and adjudicative functions not violative of due process); Porter County Chapter v.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1363, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that a combina-
tion of adjudicative and other agency functions does not violate due process unless sufficient
inherent bias exists); Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 1368, 1377 (9th Cir. 1978)
(recognizing a presumption of fairness of adjudicative enforcement procedures), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 982 (1978).
14. See, e.g., Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 581 (2d Cir. 1979).
15. See Administrative Procedure Act: Legislative History, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong.,
2d. Sess. (1946), reprinted in, Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administra-
tive Procedure, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
16. TASK FORCE ON ADMIN. PROCEEDINGS, FAIR & EFFICIENT ADMIN. PROCEEDINGS:
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ADMIN. PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SEC. AND
EXCH. COMM'N (1993) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
1993]
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Fleischman's conduct as an SEC commissioner exemplifies a healthy fifty-
nine-year tradition of vigorous debate at the SEC. These debates enhance
both the fairness and the appearance of fairness of the SEC tri-functional
process.
Of course, lack of fairness at the SEC could occur in an isolated instance
by reason of some individualized misconduct, bias, or prejudice. If this oc-
curs, the aggrieved party has an adequate remedy: appeal to a federal court.
But even isolated occurences of unfairness do not justify dismantling the
entire tri-functional process. The federal courts are already overcrowded.
Fourth, when the APA and the two principal federal securities acts 17 were
passed, there was no expectation that the SEC's quasi-judicial process would
have the attributes of an Article III court. 8 Therefore, nothing contem-
plated by Congress in passing the federal securities laws has been lost from
the process available to a respondent in an SEC administrative proceeding.
Commissioners at the numerous federal agencies are fulfilling their quasi-
judicial roles in exactly the manner contemplated under the applicable laws,
and those laws and their legislative histories do not contemplate that com-
missioners will assume Article III responsibilities.
Fifth, there is no constraint on the administrative agency arising out of the
United States Constitution. The Constitution requires due process of law
and fairness. The exercise of administrative agency quasi-judicial authority
does not fail to meet those constitutional requirements.19
Sixth, there is a constitutional check and balance on the SEC's administra-
tive process. A party alleging unfairness has recourse through appeal to an
Article III court. The federal courts have often deferred to the SEC's exper-
tise and judgment, but when necessary, the courts also have imposed their
own views, or existing court decisions, upon the SEC.20 Moreover, there are
few, if any, examples of the SEC ignoring existing court precedent while
carrying out its law enforcement and adjudicatory duties.
Seventh, there is no convincing evidence that if the SEC's key responsibili-
ties were bifurcated or trifurcated, the separation of functions would materi-
ally enhance individual rights or fairness. In fact, bifurcation or trifurcation
of the SEC's responsibilities would seriously erode the protection of inves-
tors and would not enhance fairness. The extraordinary interdependence at
the SEC by the commissioner and the staff of its twenty-one divisions and
offices is an everyday event. For any one of the participants in that process
17. See supra notes 11-12.
18. Cf Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2644 (1991) (holding that the Tax
Court is an Article I "Court[] of Law" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause).
19. See cases cited supra note 13.
20. See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); SEC
v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
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to lose immediate access to the expertise of the others would impede the
effective performance of everyone at the SEC.21
Eighth, there is a strong and obvious need for institutional expertise in
specific regulated industries. The system of government by regulation of
functions works well. Our capital markets are extremely complex, as is the
myriad of regulations on those functioning in those markets. The SEC's
historical and institutional expertise is invaluable when it carries out its tri-
functional responsibilities, and that expertise benefits every respondent in an
SEC administrative proceeding. The need for this institutional expertise
continues to grow, and hopefully someday the entire United States capital
market, securities and commodities alike, will be regulated by one agency.22
In concluding my views on Flesichman's arguments, it is important to
note that the former commissioner wrote a concurring opinion, rather than a
dissenting opinion, in The Stuart James case.23 If Fleischman truly believed
that unfairness and the appearance of unfairness exists at the SEC, one
would expect that he would have dissented. That he did not dissent suggests
that he believes that the tri-functional process of the SEC meets the constitu-
tional criteria for fairness.
While I have taken issue with Fleischman's arguments, his remarks have
served one very important purpose. They have focused increased attention
on the administrative process of regulatory agencies. There has been too
little commentary on those processes over the past decade.
My concern, especially since 1987,24 has been whether the administrative
process has become neglected at the SEC. Thus, I believe the question for
debate is whether the SEC is adequately fulfilling its administrative law or
quasi-judicial responsibilities. This question arises because of three separate
concerns.
First, I often wonder whether the policymaking responsibilites of the SEC
commissioners have come to dominate their attention and time, particularly
their speechmaking time. Because those who the SEC regulates, and their
counsel, rely upon SEC directives and commissioner speeches when deter-
mining their future conduct in our capital markets, the SEC must give suffi-
21. For example, if, as Director of Enforcement, I would not have had immediate access
to the expertise and historic perspective of members of the commissioners' staff, the Office of
General Counsel, and the Divisions of Corporation Finance, Investment Management, and
Market Regulation, the efficiency and fairness of the SEC's law enforcement process from
1981-85 would have been materially impeded,
22. Since the early 1980s, no one has ever reasonably explained why there is both an SEC
and a Commodities Futures Trading Commission.
23. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
24. The Supreme Court decided McMahon in 1987. See infra note 26.
19931
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cient attention to its non-policymaking and law enforcement duties.
However, the SEC has failed to do so in recent years.
The question concerning the SEC's overemphasis of its policymaking role
is raised as to the commissioners as a panel of five members, and does not
apply to the law enforcement responsibilities of the Division of Enforcement.
Fleischman may advocate clipping the SEC's quasi-judicial wings; I, on the
other hand, wonder if investors should not simply demand that the SEC pay
greater attention to its quasi-judicial responsibilities.
The investment community-namely, those governed by SEC regula-
tions--desperately need the SEC to speak more often, at greater length, and
more analytically in its quasi-judicial role. The SEC may regulate individu-
als, but today, far more than in 1933 and 1934, the SEC is regulating a major
part of the world economy. A greater articulation by the SEC of the respon-
sibilities of regulated persons in our rapidly expanding markets will reduce
uncertainty in determining the legality of particular conduct, and thus may
prevent conduct that the SEC would subsequently find violative of the fed-
eral securities laws.25
Second, since reading the briefs and hearing the oral arguments in Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon26 and Rodriguez de Quias v.
25. As the Committee on Independent Regulatory Commissions reported in 1949:
We recommend that the Commission give greater publicity to such rulings, and par-
ticularly to the basic underlying principles, as they become fixed. Such publicity
would guide those affected by the rulings, and enable them to keep abreast of the
Commission's policies and course of thought. By subjecting these rulings to scrutiny,
it might also aid the Commission in reaching a desirable result.
COMM. ON INDEP. REGULATORY COMM'N, A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 147-48
(1949) (prepared for the Comm'n on Org. of the Executive Branch of the Gov't).
26. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). The Supreme Court held that a broker-customer arbitration
provision is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court reasoned that arbitra-
tion clauses are favored by federal policy and law, and that the forum made available to bro-
kers and customers did not invalidate or nullify the substantive provision of the 1934 Act. Id.
at 227-28. The Court further noted that its decision was based in part upon the adequacy of
the arbitration forum, and that these mechanisms adequately protected investors' rights to
obtain substantive relief for violations of Rule lOb-5 under the 1934 Act. Id.
For 34 years prior to McMahon, the Court's decision in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953),
was the law with respect to the enforceability of broker-customer arbitration clauses in Rule
lob-5 actions. In Wilko, the Supreme Court held that a contract clause requiring arbitration
of 1933 Act disputes was not enforceable in derogation of federal court jurisdiction by virtue of
§ 14 of the 1933 Act, which rendered void any " 'condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this sub-
chapter.' " Id. at 429 n.6 (quoting § 14 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77n). Because § 22 of the
1933 Act provided for court jurisdiction over offenses and § 11 provided for suits in courts of
competent jurisdiction for false registration statements, the Supreme Court determined that
arbitration clauses were not binding or enforceable. Id. The reasoning of Wilko was carried
over to the 1934 Act cases by federal court decisions.
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Shearson/American Express, Inc. ,27 I have viewed the SEC as having an in-
creased responsibility in the administrative process to address, in reasoned
and analytical decisions, the conduct of persons the SEC regulates. Since
McMahon and Rodriguez, there has been an explosion of arbitration pro-
ceedings against brokers and their firms, and materially fewer federal district
court opinions addressing the conduct of regulated persons. The SEC has
failed to fill the absence of federal court opinions with administrative opin-
ions, releases, or commissioners' speeches and writings. It is my view that in
its briefs and arguments in McMahon and Rodriguez, the SEC said, or at
least inferred, that if the Supreme Court upheld the validity of mandatory
arbitration covenants in broker-customer contracts, the SEC would monitor
the arbitration process and actively and publicly articulate its views on the
evolving responsibilities of brokers and their firms in the rapidly changing
marketplace.
There is a great need, which has not been substantially met, for ongoing
SEC commentary about the duties and obligations of regulated persons.
Those governing in arbitration proceedings and those whose conduct is be-
ing scrutinized, as well as investors in our securities markets, need the bene-
fit of the SEC's views on the legality of new and developing trends of
conduct in rapidly changing securities markets. The tendency of the law
must always be to narrow the field of uncertainty, and I believe the SEC
needs to play a much more significant role in this narrowing of the uncer-
tainty of what conduct is expected of regulated persons.
Third, I believe the SEC is often too protective of its own views and pro-
cess. It has on occasion failed to welcome judicial scrutiny of its views. I
believe this self-protective conduct is adverse to the interests of investors and
regulated persons. The majority opinion in The Stuart-James case confirms
my view of the SEC's protectiveness. Discussing its enforcement duties and
adjudicatory role, the majority opinion stated:
When we consider whether to settle a case, we must determine
whether the settlement is in the public interest. The decision as to
whether to accept a settlement and what sanctions, if any, to im-
pose, involves diverse considerations, and can include factors
which go beyond those that would be included in the trial record
and weighed in reaching a litigated decision. To determine the
public interest we must consider these factors fully. For example,
on the one hand, we must weigh the fact that our settlements typi-
cally do not require the settling respondent to admit or deny the
allegations in the order instituting proceedings against the benefits
27. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). The Supreme Court came full circle from its original Wilko
reasoning and decided that arbitration agreements are enforceable in claims under the 1933
Act, thus overruling Wilko.
1993]
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of a more definitive resolution, one way or the other, if a case is
litigated to conclusion. On the other hand, we must consider that,
by definition, a negotiated settlement eliminates the risk of addi-
tional litigation and unfavorable precedent if an appeal is taken to a
United States Court of Appeals. 28
The SEC's remarks evidence an unhealthy protectionist attitude toward
its own views. Debate, particularly in a judicial forum, benefits the interpre-
tation of law and provides the certainty needed by those who are governed.
The SEC should always act to foster debate in a judicial forum, and the SEC
should never act simply to protect its institutional views.
28. The Stuart-James Co., 48 S.E.C. 22, 24 (1991) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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